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Do Organic Results Help or Hurt Sponsored Search Performance? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We study the impact of changes in the competitors’ listings in organic search results on the performance 
of sponsored search advertisements. Using data from an online retailer’s keyword advertising campaign, 
we measure the impact of organic competition on both click-through rate and conversion rate of 
sponsored search advertisements.  
We find that increase in organic competition leads to a decrease in the click performance of sponsored 
advertisements. However, organic competition helps the conversion performance of sponsored ads and 
leads to higher revenue.  We also find that organic competition has a higher negative effect on click 
performance than does sponsored competition.  
Our results inform advertisers on how the presence of organic results influences the performance of their 
sponsored advertisements. Specifically we show that organic competition acts as a substitute for clicks 
but has a complementary effect on the conversion performance. 
 
 
Keywords: Sponsored search, Organic search, ad placement, hierarchical Bayesian estimation, online 
advertising, online auctions, search engine marketing  
Do Organic Results Help or Hurt Sponsored Search Click and Conversion 
Performance? 
1. Introduction 
Internet advertising is currently growing faster than any other form of advertising, and is expected to 
grow from $104 billion in 2013 to $160 billion in 2016.
1
 40% of this advertising spend occurs on 
sponsored search, where advertisers pay to appear alongside the regular or organic search results of a 
search engine. A search engine functions as a two-sided market, providing a relevant match between 
information providers and consumers. Most search engines, including Google, Yahoo, and MSN, use 
auctions to sell their advertising inventory. In these auctions, advertisers submit bids for keywords based 
on their willingness to pay for a click from a consumer searching on that (or a closely related) keyword. 
Search engines use a combination of the submitted bid and expected click performance to set the position 
(rank) of the advertisement in the sponsored search results. Understanding the drivers of advertiser 
performance is important for both advertiser bidding strategies and search engine’s ranking mechanism. 
An important consideration in determining the performance of sponsored ads is the role of 
competition. Prominently placed ads by direct competitors are likely to impact performance of a 
sponsored search ad because users are more likely to compare an advertiser with its direct competitors 
before making purchases.
2
 Further, organic results are also likely to influence sponsored search 
performance given that many studies suggest that consumers pay more attention to organic results as 
compared to sponsored search results. For example, eye tracking studies show that more users are focused 
on organic results as compared to sponsored results.
3
 Thus, we expect that prominently placed organic 
results by direct competitors will impact sponsored search performance. While advertisers recognize that 
                                                     
1 http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/07/internet-ad-spend-to-reach-121b-in-2014-23-of-537b-total-ad-spend-ad-tech-gives-display-
a-boost-over-search/ 
2 Not surprisingly, there is evidence in the context of television advertising that direct competition has higher negative impact on 
advertisers as compared to non-competitors (Kent 1993) 
3 http://www.webcitation.org/5FmwyPgDv 
competitors' organic listings are relevant, very little has been formally established about how organic 
competition impacts click and conversion performance of sponsored search ads. Our paper addresses this 
question.  We define organic competition as the prominent organic listings which directly compete with 
an advertiser for product sales. The level of organic competition for a sponsored search advertiser varies 
across keywords in its campaign and also changes for a keyword over time. These variations may be 
driven by differences in the number of competitors across products (and therefore keywords) or simply by 
changes in their relative organic positions or both.  
 Existing studies on advertising in general and sponsored search in particular are not unanimous 
regarding even the direction of impact of organic competition, let alone the magnitude of their impact. 
With regard to click performance, one possibility is that higher levels of organic competition would 
further draw away user attention from the sponsored listings. For example, consumers may spend more 
time evaluating organic competition if the number of competitors increases or if these competitors are 
placed more prominently in the organic listings (Leong et al. 2012). This would lower the click 
performance of sponsored advertisements due to the added cost of evaluating higher organic competition.  
Alternatively, an increase in organic competition can make users aware of the relevance of sponsored ads. 
In that case, the presence of relevant competitors in the organic results may signal a higher quality of ads, 
thereby leading to an increase in the click propensity for a sponsored search ad. Some theoretical studies 
in sponsored search suggest such complementary effects of competition. For example, Athey and Ellison 
(2011) suggest that users may learn about the relevance of ads from organic results and Kempe and 
Mahdian (2008) suggest that low quality organic listings may turn away the user from ads.  
However, existing empirical evidence is sparse and mixed. Jeziorski and Segal (2012) show that 
higher competition from sponsored advertisements leads to lower marginal utility of the advertiser and to 
lower click propensity. Similarly, higher organic competition might lower the click performance of ads 
just like sponsored competition. On the contrary, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. (2010) find that an 
increase in the click probability of top organic listing is also accompanied by an increase in the click 
probability of top sponsored listing, irrespective of the identity of the firm, suggesting that a 
complementary effect might exist between organic and sponsored results. However, the authors do not 
account for unobservable keyword characteristics and it is therefore unclear whether the result is driven 
by true complementarity or simply by unobserved consumer preferences for keywords rather than actual 
consumer response to increase in the organic competition. Finally, Yang and Ghose (2010) find that an 
advertiser’s own organic listing has a complementary effect on its own sponsored listing: an increase in 
the click probability of an organic listing of an advertiser increases the click probability of its sponsored 
listing. They attribute this result to the positive opinion generated by advertiser’s organic listing. Whether 
the same effect applies for increased organic competition is an open empirical question. Thus, it is not 
clear whether organic competition takes user attention away from a sponsored search ad thereby reducing 
its clicks or helps generate trust and thereby increases clicks for sponsored search advertisements.  
Additionally, studies in the literature have only considered the effect of organic listings on click-
throughs, not conversions. A priori, it would appear that post click conversion should not be affected by 
the variation in competition because prescreening information may be irrelevant in subsequent search 
behavior (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkumen 2006). Thus, user conversion may be influenced more 
by the information presented on the landing page for an ad than by the information evaluated prior to 
clicking on the ad. However, the learning effect can also help drive conversions.  Buyers are more 
involved as compared to other consumers (Moe 2003) and may demonstrate a higher learning effect. As a 
result, the presence of relevant direct competitors may cause a buying consumer to perceive the advertiser 
to be a higher quality and thereby increase the probability of conversion. Finally, the sequence in which 
results are evaluated can also influence the conversion performance. It is well known that primacy (a 
preference for a product that was evaluated first) and recency (a preference for the most recently 
evaluated product) affect both brand and product recall in many environments. If more competitors show 
up in the prominent positions then consumers are more likely to visit the advertiser towards the end of 
their search. In that case a primacy effect may cause conversion rates to drop when dominant competitors 
appearing in organic results are evaluated earlier. In contrast, some studies show that in sequential choice 
environments, consumers are disproportionately influenced by the attractiveness of the most recently 
evaluated product. In sponsored search environments, recency effects play a role for the top few positions 
(Agarwal, Hosanagar and Smith 2011). In that case, higher organic competition can cause conversion 
rates to increase due to recency effect. Thus, it is possible that changes in organic competition might 
affect conversion rates as well. Table 1 summarizes the relevant literature and the likely impact suggested 
by these papers. 
In the present paper we analyze how competition from prominent organic listings of direct 
competitors impacts click and conversion performance in sponsored search. We use a field experiment to 
generate a unique panel dataset of daily clicks, orders, and costs for multiple keywords in a sponsored 
search advertising campaign for an online retailer. Our experiment systematically varies the bids on ads to 
achieve a wide range of positions in the list of sponsored search results. We also use a web crawler to 
capture competitors’ organic and sponsored search results displayed alongside our advertisements. We 
account for potential endogeneity in our measure of organic competition and validate our results with 
alternative measures of competition and several other robustness measures. 
 We have three main findings. First, we find that click performance of ads decreases with increase in 
organic competition. This suggests that organic competition imposes a negative externality on sponsored 
search performance. Second, we find that conversion rate and revenues increase with greater organic 
competition. In the presence of increased organic competition, buyers visiting a sponsored ad are more 
likely to buy from the ad, potentially due to higher quality perception of ads in the presence of high 
quality of organic competition. Third, we find that organic competition has a higher impact on the 
performance of ads as compared to sponsored competition. Users may trust organic results more than 
sponsored results (Jansen and Resnick, 2006) and, as a result, may be more responsive to changes in 
organic competition as compared to the changes in sponsored competition. In short, our results show that 
organic competition acts as a substitute for clicks but has a complementary effect on conversion 
performance. Overall, the findings of this study extend the understanding of consumer behavior in 
sponsored search and yield important implications for advertisers and search engines. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first review the related literature and provide the 
theoretical background. In §3, we describe the data and the definition of competition measures. In §4, we 
discuss the model and the estimation procedure. In §5, we explain our results. We discuss the implications 
of our results and conclude the paper in §6. 
2. Theoretical Background 
Our research is most closely related to the literature on consumers’ online search and purchase behavior, 
with an emphasis on the impact of message ordering and competition. Our research is also related to the 
literature on advertiser performance in sponsored search. We draw from these two literatures to explain 
the potential impact of organic competition on sponsored search performance. 
Consumers’ online search and purchase behavior 
A specific aspect of search behavior that our work relates to is the order of messages and its implications 
on search and consumer choice. Prior work in traditional media has demonstrated that message ordering 
influences ad persuasion (Rhodes et al. 1973, Brunel and Nelson, 2003). Similar results have been shown 
in online environments. Hoque and Lohse (1999) find that consumers are more likely to choose 
advertisements near the beginning of an online directory than they are when using paper directories. 
Ansari and Mela (2003) have found that in an email campaign, higher position listings lead to a higher 
probability of clicking. There is also evidence that ordering of sponsored search results impacts 
performance. For example, Ghose and Yang (2009) find that the click through rate of an advertisement 
decreases with position.  
Sponsored search performance is also affected by the intensity of competition, which may not be fully 
reflected in an ad’s relative position. Animesh, Viswanathan and Agarwal (2011) define competition in 
terms of the quality of competitors who are advertising alongside a focal ad and show that higher intensity 
of such competition lowers the click performance of an advertiser. Similarly, Jeziorski and Segal (2012) 
find that advertisers appearing higher up in the search results impose a negative externality on the lower 
ads and attribute it to information satiation.  
While these studies have focused on ad position and competition intensity vis-à-vis sponsored search 
competitors, both the level of competition and the order in which an ad is evaluated are impacted by 
organic competitors as well. Using eye tracking analysis, Granka et al. (2004) find that users generally 
investigate search results sequentially, from top to bottom and left to right. This suggests that a sponsored 
search ad appearing on the right hand side is likely to be reviewed after the organic results appearing to 
the left and above the sponsored search ad. In that case, any variation in organic competition can impact 
competitive intensity as well as the order in which results are evaluated and, in turn, an ad’s click and 
conversion performance. Even if sponsored ads appear above the organic listings they receive less 
attention as compared to the top organic listings (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2010). 
In terms of click performance, one possibility is that an increase in organic competition negatively 
impacts clickthrough rates of sponsored ads in much the same way that an increase in sponsored 
competition does. That is, satiation through competing products in the organic results may imply that 
fewer consumers will reach and click the sponsored search ad. However, an increase in organic 
competition can make consumers aware of the relevance of sponsored ads to their search. There is 
evidence of such positive spillover of competition (Liu et al 2015; Sahni 2013) on a firm as advertising by 
competition makes users aware of the relevance of a category and consider other products in the category. 
As a result, consumers may update their belief about the quality of the sponsored ad in the presence of 
high organic competition. Athey and Ellison (2011) suggest the possibility of such Bayesian updating as 
consumers sequentially evaluate ads. This is particularly important in analyzing the interplay between 
organic and sponsored results because consumers are known to trust organic results more than sponsored 
search results (Jansen and Resnick 2006). As a result, consumers may learn about the quality of ads based 
on their evaluation of prominent competing listings including competitors’ organic listings. Further, 
Dellaert and Haubl (2012) show that users are likely to terminate their search early when they 
sequentially evaluate a list of recommendations and there is high variability or poor accuracy. In the 
search context, consumers may form an expectation about ad relevance based on the presence of organic 
competition and greater organic competition may lead to higher click performance for a sponsored ad. 
Advertiser revenues depend not only on clicks but also on conversion/purchase probability after 
clicking on an ad. One possibility is that organic competition has no impact on purchase probability 
conditional on clicking. Some studies show that consumers tend to deemphasize prescreening information 
in their search process (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkumen 2006). This suggests that the criteria used 
for selecting an advertisement may not affect the final purchase as much as information obtained after 
visiting the website. Thus, if a consumer discounts all prescreening information and buys from the 
website that maximizes his or her utility, conversion rate may not be affected by competition.  
Alternatively, buying consumers may form expectations about the quality of a sponsored ad based on 
previously evaluated listings and this can influence their purchase behavior conditional on clicking the ad. 
As mentioned earlier, consumers may demonstrate a learning effect based on their evaluation of organic 
competition. Further, buying consumers are more likely to be involved as compared to browsing 
consumers (Moe 2003). Such high involvement leads to better retrieval of information (Park and Hastak, 
1994) and high attention leads to superior learning (Wood and Lynch 2002). Thus, buying consumers 
may show a higher learning effect as compared to consumers just collecting information and maybe more 
likely to update their belief about the quality of sponsored ad in the presence of high competition. In that 
case, high trust for organic results (Jansen and Resnick 2006) may cause buyers to value an ad more in 
presence of higher organic competition leading to higher conversion rate conditional on clicking. 
Additionally, this learning effect can depend on the user’s ability to recall competitors and their attributes. 
When a consumer visits the site associated with an ad, in order to compare attributes of all the evaluated 
listings, she has to recall competing brands and their attributes from previously visited sites in the search 
results.  Kent and Allen (1994) find that it is easier to recall a familiar brand vs unfamiliar brand.  In 
sponsored search, consumers are more likely to be familiar with direct competitors appearing in 
prominent organic positions. Thus, we can expect that consumer is more likely to recall prominent 
organic competition and update her belief about the quality of the advertiser. 
Finally, sequential evaluation can also influence conversion performance conditional on clicking. It is 
well known that consumers cannot perfectly recall product information from all evaluated products and 
websites, and the sequence in which they evaluate these choices can affect their purchase decision. An 
increase in organic competition associated with a focal advertiser would draw more user attention to these 
competitors’ listings. If this reduces the click through rate of the focal ad, it also implies consumers who 
do end up clicking the focal ad are more likely to click the ad towards the end of their search. Traditional 
advertising studies have demonstrated primacy effects in the recall of brand and product information (e.g., 
Pieters and Bijmolt 1997). If primacy effect plays a role then consumers may be more likely to go back to 
the competitors’ organic listings to buy from these listings. This can result in a conversion rate that 
decreases with increased organic competition for a given position of the advertiser. However, recency 
effects might help the sponsored ads in presence of higher organic competition. Wyer and Srull (1986) 
show recency effects under conditions of high information load. Wedel and Pieters (2000) also find a 
recency effect in the recall of advertisements in a print magazine. Häubl, Benedict, and Bas (2010) show 
that in the context of sequential choice, consumers are disproportionately influenced by the attractiveness 
of the most recently evaluated product. This suggests that the consumers who are likely to buy are more 
likely to do so from the website they evaluate last rather than the website they evaluate early in their 
sequential search. Agarwal, Hosanagar and Smith (2011) find that conversion rate for ads increases with 
position for the top few positions, which they attribute to such a recency effect. Organic competition may 
have a similar effect at a particular ad position. If higher organic competition leads buyers to visit a 
sponsored ad later, then consumers may be more likely to buy from the sponsored ad in presence of 
higher organic competition. 
We summarize the relevant theories and the predictions that emerge from these theories in Table 1. In 
summary, there is a strong reason to believe that organic competition will impact performance of 
sponsored search ads but the nature of this impact is not obvious.  
Sponsored search markets 
Existing work in sponsored search has focused on auction design, consumer behavior, and advertiser 
strategy. In terms of work on auction design from the search engine’s perspective, Edelman et al. (2007) 
compute the equilibria of the generalized second price sponsored search auction and demonstrate that this 
auction, unlike the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, is not incentive compatible. Weber and 
Zheng (2007) compare the performance of various ad-ranking mechanisms, finding that a yield-optimized 
auction, with ranking based on a combination of the submitted bid and ad relevance, provides the highest 
revenue to the search engine. Dellarocas (2012) evaluates the double marginalization issue associated 
with sponsored search auctions and suggests that the current design can lead to lower consumer surplus as 
well as social surplus. Xu et al. (2011) evaluate the impact of endogenous pricing on the advertiser 
incentives for bidding. Liu, Chen and Whinston (2010) study the impact of different ranking policies and 
minimum bids on the bidding outcome when the advertisers differ in their click potential or preference. 
Liu and Viswanathan (2014) evaluate the performance of the different pay-for-performance pricing 
schemes in online advertising in the presence of information asymmetry. These studies do not focus on 
the organic competition and its impact on the auction design.    
In terms of consumer behavior, Ghose and Yang (2009) and Agarwal, Hosanagar and Smith (2011) 
study the impact of ad position on click and conversion performance. Rutz and Trusov (2011) study the 
impact of ad textual properties on consumer click propensity. However, none of these studies considers 
the impact of organic results on consumer behavior. In their theoretical work, Katona and Sarvary (2010) 
assume a preference for organic results on the part of consumers, and Jansen and Resnick (2006) find 
results consistent with a negative bias for sponsored search ads relative to organic search results. Xu et al. 
(2012) investigate the bidding incentive of different advertisers in presence of organic listings. Yang and 
Ghose (2010) find complementarity between an advertiser’s own organic listing and its sponsored listing. 
However, these papers do not consider the impact of competitors’ organic listings on sponsored search 
results. Additionally, while modeling clicks, Yang and Ghose (2010) do not explicitly study the effect of 
organic results on the conversion performance of sponsored ads. Prior research suggests that consumer 
conversion behavior can differ significantly from their click behavior (Agarwal, Hosanagar and Smith 
2011).  
In terms of work on advertiser strategies, several recent studies have focused on optimal bidding 
strategies for advertisers (Feldman et al. 2007; Xu et al. 2012; Hosanagar and Cherapanov,  2008; 
Abhishek and Hosanagar, 2013). Zhang and Feng (2011) show that advertisers may engage in cyclical bid 
adjustments, and equilibrium bidding prices may follow a cyclical pattern. However, none of these studies 
explicitly investigate the impact of organic competition on advertiser revenues and profitability. Animesh, 
Viswanathan and Agarwal (2011) show that competitive intensity has a different impact on click 
performance depending on the differentiation of the advertiser. This highlights the importance of studying 
competitive intensity. 
Our work complements these studies on sponsored search markets by evaluating the impact of 
organic competition on ad performance and demonstrating the value of that insight for advertisers. 
3. Data 
Our main dataset was generated through a field experiment with a pet product company’s sponsored 
search ad campaign on Google.  The data were generated by submitting randomized bids for several 
keywords and measuring consumer response in terms of clicks and orders for varying organic competition 
associated with the ads corresponding to the keywords. Next we explain our experimental design and how 
we construct our measure of competition. 
To evaluate organic competition for a sponsored search ad, we consider prominent organic results of 
direct competitors that are likely to compete for attention with the sponsored search ad. Prior research 
suggests that consumers evaluate search results from top to bottom and left to right and pay greater 
attention to organic results as compared to sponsored results (Granka et al. 2004). In that case, consumers 
considering an ad are very likely to pay attention to organic results appearing at the same level or above 
and to the left of the ad. As a result, we consider the relevant organic competition for an advertiser to be 
competitors’ organic listings that appear at the same level or above and to the left of the advertiser’s ad 
for a keyword.
4
 
                                                     
4 When our advertiser appears on the top left side we consider the competing organic listing appearing in the top position as the 
relevant organic competition. This is due to the fact that top organic listing receives more attention than sponsored ads appearing 
above this listing (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 2010). 
In order to study the effect of organic competition on click and conversion performance of sponsored 
search ads, we can evaluate ad performance as a function of the variation in the organic competition 
across keywords. However, variation in competition across keywords and over time may not be truly 
exogenous. The extent of direct organic competition for a keyword may reflect consumer demand and 
advertiser fit with the keyword. If consumers are more likely to respond to product listings for a given 
keyword or at a given time (say during the holidays), then the search engine may be more likely to show 
several product listings in organic results and competitors may also be more likely to invest in search 
engine optimization to drive higher placement in organic search. Thus, high levels of organic competition 
for a keyword may be a result of consumer preferences rather than the other way around. This makes the 
identification of the effect of organic competition difficult. In order to address this challenge we attempt 
to create variation in organic competition for each keyword to establish the effect of organic competition.    
Organic competition for a keyword may change over time in response to exogenous website changes 
made by the corresponding firms or due to endogenous strategic decisions by firms in response to 
consumer demand. Ideally, we want to drive some exogenous variation in the number and intensity of 
competitors. While it is hard for us to introduce random changes in organic results, we can achieve such 
variation in organic competition for an ad by varying the ad position over time. For example, Figure 1 
shows the competitors’ organic listings for two different positions of the focal advertiser at two different 
points in time. The number and the relative positions of competitors’ organic listings appearing above and 
to the left of the focal ad are different for the two ad positions. Thus, consumers visiting the sponsored ad 
at different positions are likely to evaluate different levels of organic competition, which means that the 
click and conversion performance of ad can be evaluated as a function of the organic competition after 
controlling for the effect of ad position. We achieve this variation in the ad position and the corresponding 
organic competition by randomizing bids for each ad. Randomized bid allow us to rotate the ads 
associated with the experimental keywords across multiple positions on the results page and measure 
consumer response in terms of clicks and orders as a function of organic competition for a wide range of 
ad positions. While this approach allows us to focus on organic competition appearing above or at the 
same level a focal advertiser, it does not capture the effect of organic competition appearing in other 
positions. This is a limitation of our approach. 
 Our experiment keywords were randomly chosen from a set of keywords in the campaign that had 
generated clicks and at least one order for the retailer in the past 60 days. We used the Google’s keyword 
tool to determine the range of bids for each keyword. The bid range was wide enough for each keyword to 
ensure that corresponding ads could be placed in various slots available on the first page. Additionally, we 
ensured that the ad for a keyword appears in a particular position for several days. All sponsored search 
data came from Google’s advertiser dashboard. In addition, we used an automated web crawler to 
determine the organic results that consumers would see in response to search queries corresponding to the 
experimental keywords.
5
  
Google allows advertisers to use ‘broad,’ ‘exact’ or ‘phrase’ match for their keywords. An ‘exact’ 
match ensures that the search query exactly matches the chosen keywords. However, that is not true for a 
“broad” match or a “phrase match.” For example, if the advertiser bids on a keyword ‘shirt’ with a broad 
match, its ad can be shown in response to all search queries that include the word ‘shirt’. However, if the 
advertiser specifies an ‘exact’ match then its ad will be shown only for a search query ‘shirt’.  One issue 
with “broad” and “phrase” match keywords is that the exact set of competitors may vary based on the 
search query. In the example above, if the advertiser bids on keyword ‘shirt’ with a broad match then its 
ad can potentially be matched with 800 keyphrases according to Google Adwords (e.g., “red shirt,” 
“formal shirt”). In that case, we won’t know the actual keyphrases for which the ad was shown and the 
corresponding organic results.
6
 To ensure that we can replicate the search results corresponding to the 
keywords, we have only used keywords with an ‘exact’ match in our sample. This ensures that we know 
the actual search term that was used by the consumer and therefore can replicate the organic results that 
the consumer would most likely have seen. 
                                                     
5 Our web crawler extracted search results on an hourly basis during the panel period.  Our web crawler program ran on two 
different servers in different geographic locations: Pittsburgh and Austin. Search results obtained from both servers were similar 
indicating that users were likely to see the same search results. We considered the average across both cities to determine their daily 
position 
6
 Note that this information is only available to the search engine and is not shared with advertisers 
Organic search results for every keyword can include listings of websites selling related products as 
well as listings for purely information oriented sites such as wikis and information portals. We identify 
competitors’ listings as listings which are selling a product similar as our focal advertiser. Sponsored 
search results can also include advertisers who are not selling similar products. We eliminate such 
advertisers. For example, an advertiser offering ‘dog care’ may show up as a sponsored ad for ‘dog food’ 
and we do not consider it as a competitor for an advertiser selling dog food. We determine 136 
competitors’ organic results and 108 other organic results for our keywords appearing above or at the 
same level as our advertiser’s ad. We also determine 89 competitors’ sponsored results and 30 other 
sponsored results, and we verified the list of competitors with our advertiser.  
We represent organic competition and sponsored competition in terms of the daily cumulative number 
of competitors’ listings for each type appearing at the same level or above the focal ad (see Figure 1). 
Consumers may place more attention on a competitor listed very high relative to a competitor appearing 
lower in the listings. As a result, we weigh each competitor’s listing by its position to account for the 
relative prominence of the listing. Further, the intensity of competition will be higher if the organic 
competition includes competitors with high perceived quality versus a scenario where the organic 
competition has competitors with relatively low perceived quality. For example, if a listing from a brand 
with higher perceived quality appears higher, it can have a greater impact on user choice as compared to a 
listing of competitor with lower perceived quality. In order to account for such differential effect of 
competing sites, we normalize the position of a listing with a measure of a competitor’s perceived quality. 
Following the literature, we use the Alexa rank obtained from alexa.com as the measure of perceived 
quality for competitor listings appearing in organic and sponsored search results (Brynjolfsson and Smith 
2000, Palmer 2002, Animesh et al. 2010). Alexa rank is computed based on alexa.com’s estimate of daily 
unique visitors and page views for the website.
7
 Daily unique visitors capture the number of visitors, and 
page views capture the engagement of these visitors. Websites are ranked based on an alexa.com 
                                                     
7 https://alexa.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/200449744-How-are-Alexa-s-traffic-rankings-determined- 
proprietary function that combines the number of visitors and page views. Note that Alexa rank may vary 
over time and we use the average Alexa rank of each website during the panel period of the experiment to 
represent the perceived quality of the website. Therefore, we specify the level of competition for each 
type of listing as  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘𝑡 = ∑
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹)
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐶𝑘𝑡×𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡)
𝐶𝑘𝑡
 where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐶𝑘𝑡  is the position of the listing of competitor C 
for keyword k at time t and 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡  is its average Alexa Rank for the panel period. 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐹  is the 
Alexa rank of the focal advertiser.  
 Thus, a lower position (higher numerical value) of a competitor’s listing will result in a lower 
contribution to the measure of competition. Similarly, lower quality of a competitor’s listing (higher 
numerical value of the Alexa Rank) would lead to a lower contribution. To ensure that our results are 
robust to our measure of competition, we also consider simpler alternative measures of organic 
competition and sponsored competition. These include measures based only on the competitor’s position 
in the organic results (i.e. no Alexa rank) and only on the competitor’s perceived quality (i.e. no position). 
These measures are defined in the Model section. Our results are qualitatively similar for all three 
measures and are described in the results section.  
In order to account for other factors that may influence consumer click behavior on sponsored results, 
we also capture the quality score measure maintained by Google and available to the advertiser 
(LQscore). This measure represents the click propensity of an advertiser and is calculated by Google 
based on several metrics including the relative clickthrough rate of the advertiser for the keyword, and the 
relative quality of the ad and landing page. Google uses a sliding window to determine the value of the 
quality score. However, this value remained unchanged during the course of the experiment for our 
keywords.  
Our resulting data set consists of 1440 observations of daily impressions, clicks, and orders for 36 
keywords over a 40-day period from June 2009 to July 2009. Table 2 provides summary statistics for our 
data and Table 3 provides the correlation matrix for our main variables. Note that the observations 
represent daily aggregate data for advertisements corresponding to the sample keywords for our 
advertiser, and that the dataset is typical of the information received by sponsored search advertisers. 
Advertisers do not receive individual-level impressions or clicks data and do not have information on the 
performance of competing advertisements. 
4. Simultaneous Model 
Consider an advertiser placing bids for a keyword in order to ensure its advertisements are visible in the 
list of sponsored results for queries related to that keyword. The search engine uses this bid, and the 
expected ad performance, to determine the advertisement’s position in the list of sponsored search ads. 
The search engine also shows the corresponding organic results. Consumers see the organic results and 
advertisements, and decide to click on some of the ads, and subsequently decide whether to make a 
purchase. Thus, the search engine’s decisions influence both the position of our advertiser and the 
competitors’ listings in organic and sponsored results. We simultaneously model consumers’ click-
through and conversion behavior, and use an IV approach to address the endogeneity of ad position and 
competition measures.  
Click through Rate per Impression (CTR)   
A consumer’s choice of clicking on an advertisement can be modeled in terms of the latent utility of 
clicking. This in turn depends on the position of the advertisement and the quality of the advertiser, as 
well as the competition from organic and sponsored results. Consumers are expected to search 
sequentially from top to bottom (Ghose and Yang, 2009). An ad’s position influences its click 
performance. A lower position may lead to a perception of lower quality as consumers are used to 
evaluating ads in the decreasing order of quality. Further, consumers can be influenced by the extent of 
competition appearing above the focal advertisement. As mentioned earlier, we count the total number of 
competitors while accounting for the position and the Alexa rank of the listing.
8
 
                                                     
8 Below, we analyze the sensitivity of our results to alternate measures of competition. 
We use the quality score measure provided by the search engine in order to account for other factors, 
such as ad relevance and the quality of the landing page. The advertiser’s own listing can appear in the 
organic results for certain keywords and can influence the performance of the sponsored listing (Yang and 
Ghose, 2010). We control for this by using a dummy variable which is set to one if the advertiser’s 
organic listing appears on the first page, and is set to zero otherwise.
9
  
Our unit of analysis is a keyword because the search engine auction is keyword specific. Keyword 
characteristics are an indication of underlying search behavior, which varies across consumers. For 
example, the keyword ‘dog food’ is less specific and likely indicates an initial stage of information 
search, while more specific keywords (e.g., ‘natural dog food, ‘ Freshpet dog food rolls ’) likely indicate a 
more advanced and directed stage of information search. To account for these differences across 
keywords, we capture how specific a keyword is using two different measures: ‘specificity’ and ‘brand.’ 
The specificity of a keyword is based on the nearness of its landing page to the product. Advertisers 
organize their websites in a hierarchical fashion to accommodate the search intent of users and to reduce 
their search cost. Levels in the hierarchy represent product categories, sub-categories and products. When 
consumers are routed through a search engine, the landing page coincides with a level in the website 
hierarchy that is chosen based on the search intent of the consumer as reflected in the keyword. We define 
specificity as the level in the product hierarchy of the advertiser. For example, a top level keyword such 
as ‘pet food’ would have the specificity value of 0, a second level keyword representing products such as 
‘dog food’ would have the specificity value of 1 and so on. Figure 2 shows the hierarchy for pet food in a 
representative website in the pet food market and the associated specificity levels. Brand is indicated by 
the presence of a well-recognized manufacturer brand name in the keyphrase.
10
 This approach for 
representing keyword heterogeneity is similar to the one adopted by Agarwal, Hosanagar, and Smith 
(2011), Ghose and Yang (2009), and Yang and Ghose (2010).  
                                                     
9 We have separately verified that our results are robust even if we use the actual position of the organic listing. 
10 Our experimental keywords do not include the brand name of our focal advertiser and any other competing retailer 
We use a hierarchical model to capture the effect of keyword characteristics. This provides a flexible 
random component specification that allows us to incorporate both observable and unobservable 
keyword-specific heterogeneity, given the small number of observations for each keyword. This approach 
allows us to do a within keyword analysis and ensure that the effect of organic competition is not 
confounded by the unobserved heterogeneity across keywords. Further, hierarchical models are 
commonly used to draw inferences on individual level characteristics (e.g., Rossi and Allenby, 2003). 
Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) models have also recently been applied to study sponsored search data with 
keywords as a unit of analysis (Ghose and Yang 2009; Yang and Ghose 2010; Agarwal, Hosanagar, and 
Smith 2011; Rutz et al. 2012). 
In our model we assume an i.i.d. extreme value distribution of the error term for individual choices 
and use a logit model to represent the click probability for a keyword k at time t as follows 
(1)                                                       𝛬𝑘,𝑡
𝐶𝑇𝑅 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝⁡(𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑇𝑅)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝⁡(𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑇𝑅)
 
where Ukt
CTR
 is the latent utility of clicking. For a keyword k at time t, the latent utility of clicking can be 
expressed as 
(2)  𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑇𝑅 = 𝜃0
𝑘 + 𝜃1
𝑘𝐴𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃2
𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃3
𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑡 +
⁡𝜃5𝐿𝑄𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑘𝑡 +⁡𝜃𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜃  
𝜽𝒌 = ∆𝜃𝑧𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘
𝜃⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑢𝑘
𝜃⁡~𝑁(0, 𝑉𝜃)  
where AdPos represents the position of the ad in the sponsored search results,  
Organic_Comp is competition in organic results, 
Sponsored_Comp is competition in sponsored results, 
Organic is a dummy indicating whether the advertiser’s organic listing appears on the top page for 
keyword k and time t,  
LQScore is the quality score of the ad, 
Time controls for time dynamics in the auction, 
εkt
θ
 represents the time varying unobserved keyword attributes that are common for all consumers, 
zk represents keyword specific characteristics: brand and specificity, 
∆θ is a matrix capturing the relationship between keyword characteristics and the mean values of 
coefficients, 
and uk
θ
 represents the unobservable heterogeneity for each keyword, which we assume is normally 
distributed with a mean 0 and covariance matrix V
θ 
We consider random coefficients for our main variables of interest which are also varying for each 
keyword. For the control variables we assume that the variation in response across keywords is captured 
by the coefficient of the constant term. This approach is commonly used in the random coefficient models 
as it leads to no change in the model parameters for the variables of interest (Duan and Mela, 2009, Ghose 
and Yang 2009; Yang and Ghose 2010).   
Conversion Rate per Click (CONV) 
Conversion rate (probability) refers to the fraction of clicks that generate orders. A consumer’s choice of 
buying conditional on clicking would depend on the position to account for the recall effects as observed 
in previous research (Ghose and Yang, 2009; Agarwal, Hosanagar, and Smith 2011). It is possible that the 
complementarity of the advertiser’s own organic listing has an effect on the conversion performance as 
well. The conversion behavior would also be influenced by the competition and the quality score (Ghose 
and Yang, 2009). 
 Assuming an i.i.d. extreme value distribution of the error term for individual choices, we can express 
the conversion probability as 
(3)                                                  𝛬𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉)
 
where Ukt
CONV
 is the latent utility of conversion, which may depend on the position of the advertisement. 
As above, organic and sponsored competition can influence the conversion probability. For keyword k at 
time t, this latent utility can be expressed as 
(4)  𝑈𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉 = 𝛽0
𝑘 + 𝛽1
𝑘𝐴𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑡 ⁡+ 𝛽2
𝑘𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3
𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑡 +
+𝛽5𝐿𝑄𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝛽
 
𝜷𝒌 = ∆𝛽𝑧𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘
𝛽
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑢𝑘
𝛽
~𝑁(0, 𝑉𝛽)  
We also include controls for the time dynamics. 
Ad Position 
The search engine determines the position of an advertisement for a keyword based on the product of the 
current bid and the quality of the advertisement relative to competing ads. As mentioned earlier, this 
relative quality measure is called the ‘quality score’ and is available to advertisers through Google. The 
dependence of ad position on bid and quality score introduces two sources of endogeneity: that related to 
the advertiser’s bid decision and that related to the search engine’s ad position decision. Advertisers can 
influence the position of their advertisements by changing their bids (for example to optimize 
performance). As a consequence, position is endogenously determined. Further, search engines might 
assign advertisers to specific positions that yield the search engine the highest revenues. 
In order to control for this potential endogeneity, we have to account for the advertiser’s bid choices 
as well as the position assigned by the search engine. In our setup, bids were randomized for the sample 
keywords. Thus the bid amounts are, by design, exogenous during the field experiment, taking away any 
strategic effect of our advertiser. Using a wide range of random bids also ensures that even if other 
advertisers are bidding using their own objective functions, the advertisements in our experiment are 
exposed to consumers over a wide range of positions.  
Endogeneity is also introduced because search engines use ad performance data to compute an ad’s 
position. In order to account for this, we use an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach and model ad 
position as a function of the randomized bid. As a search engine uses both bid and quality score to 
determine an ad’s position, we also account for the effect of quality score.  Similar approaches have been 
used by Ghose and Yang (2009) and Agarwal, Hosanagar, and Smith (2011). As a result, we express the 
ad position for a keyword k at time t as 
(5) 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑡) = 𝛾0
𝑘 + 𝛾1
𝑘𝑙𝑛(𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑘,𝑡)+⁡𝛾2(𝐿𝑄𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑘𝑡) ⁡+ 𝛾𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑘𝑡 + ⁡𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝛾
 
𝜸𝒌 = ∆𝛾𝑧𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘
𝛾
 and ⁡𝑢𝑘
𝛾 ⁡~𝑁(0, 𝑉𝛾) 
Note that the position of the advertisement is the daily average position, and is a continuous variable. This 
functional form ensures that the bid and the listed quality score, LQscore, are required to determine the ad 
position.  
Organic Competition 
Firms continuously strive to improve their sites to increase their relevance, and thereby improve their 
position in search results for different keywords. However, they can also do this systematically in 
response to unobservable time-varying demand patterns. These demand patterns can be different for 
different products and the corresponding keywords. For example, a particular product may increase in 
popularity over time. In that case, the consumer click and conversion behavior for the related keyword 
would be driven by the increase in the preference for the product. At the same time, firms might improve 
their organic ranking to respond to this increase in demand. As a result, the organic competition for the 
focal advertiser would also increase for that keyword. Thus, both consumer response and organic 
competition would be correlated with the unobservable demand for the keyword and the underlying 
product. As a consequence, the effect of organic competition on click and conversion performance can be 
biased.  
As we consider only those competitors’ listings that appear above or at the same level of our focal 
advertiser, the randomization of bids and the subsequent positions ensures that the competitors’ organic 
listings are also randomized to a large extent. However for a given ad position, the organic competition is 
still changing somewhat, and the changes could be correlated with time-varying unobservable demand 
shocks. We use an IV approach to account for this potential endogeneity bias. For every keyword in our 
sample, we consider the competing firms in the organic listings and determine the average organic 
position for each competitor for other non-related keywords.
11
 These non-related keywords refer to non-
related products which are not likely to share the same consumer valuation as the products associated with 
the focal keywords. 
                                                     
11 Our webcrawler data collection was for a large number of keywords. However, the bid randomization was possible only for a 
smaller set which form the focal keywords in our analysis. 
We use this average organic position for each competitor for a keyword to compute the instrumental 
variable for its organic competition as shown below:  
𝐼𝑉𝑘𝑡 = ∑
1
1
𝑛
𝑘𝑐
′
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑠
𝑘𝑐
′ 𝑡𝑘𝑐
′
𝐶  where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑐′𝑡 is the organic position for a non-related keyword 𝑘𝑐
′  at time t of 
the competitor C associated with keyword k and 𝑛𝑘𝑐′  is the number of non-related keywords for 
competitor C. 
Our IV exploits the notion that the kinds of website changes that lead to improvements in one section 
of a website also contribute to improvements in other sections of the website. That is, better organic 
placement for one section of the website through such website improvements will be correlated to 
improvements in organic placements for another section even if these sections offer very different 
products with very different demand patterns. As a result, we would expect correlations between the 
positions of the organic listing of non-related keywords while expecting consumer valuations for these 
keywords to be largely independent. We use the website hierarchy of our advertiser (Figure 2) to 
determine the non-related keywords for each of our sample keywords. Keywords are associated with 
different products in the website hierarchy. For each sample keyword, we pick keywords which are 
associated with non-related products from a different part of the website hierarchy. For a keyword related 
to a particular type of pet, we consider non-related keywords as keywords that are associated with a 
different pet. For example, ‘cat food’ is not related to ‘dog food’ or ‘dog food rolls’. However, it is related 
to ‘canned cat food’ and ‘raw cat food’. This approach allows us to pick keywords which are less likely to 
be correlated in consumer valuations.  
Note that the consumer valuation can be correlated if the firm has the same promotions across 
multiple products. However, this is more likely to be the case for related products. By selecting the 
position of non-related keywords we minimize the impact of such correlation. This is similar to the 
approach adopted by Hausman et al. (1996), Nevo (2001) and more recently Ghose, Ipeirotis, and Li 
(2012) to use prices of the product in other markets as an instrument.  As explained below, we also 
validate the strength and the exogeneity of our instrument and verify our results with two alternative 
instruments. 
 Using this approach, organic competition can be specified as a function of the IV variable as follows: 
 (6) 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑘 + 𝛼1
𝑘𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑘𝑡 + ⁡𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝛼  
𝜶𝒌 = ∆𝛼𝑧𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘
𝛼 and ⁡𝑢𝑘
𝛼 ⁡~𝑁(0, 𝑉𝛼) 
where IVOrganickt is the instrument described above.  
Finally, as the position of the advertisement as well as organic competition are endogenous, the 
unobservable time varying keyword attributes for the equations representing consumer decisions will be 
correlated with error terms for the equations representing position and organic competition. As such, we 
use the following distribution to account for correlation between the error terms: 
(7)                        
[
 
 
 
 𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝛽
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝜃
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝛾
𝜀𝑘𝑡
𝛼 ]
 
 
 
 
⁡~𝑁(0,𝛺) where 𝛺 = [
𝛺11 𝛺12⁡ 𝛺13 𝛺14
𝛺21 𝛺22⁡ 𝛺23 𝛺24
𝛺31 𝛺32⁡ 𝛺33 𝛺34
𝛺41 𝛺42⁡ 𝛺43 𝛺44
] 
Identification 
The above set of simultaneous equations represent a triangular system, which has been addressed by 
authors in classical (Lahiri and Schmidt 1978, Hausman 1975, Greene 1999) and Bayesian econometrics 
(Zellner 1962). It can be represented as follows: 
Ukt
CTR = f(Ad⁡Position, Organic⁡Competition, X1, εkt
θ ) 
Ukt
CONV = f(Ad⁡Position, Organic⁡Competition, X2, εkt
β
) 
Ad⁡Position = f(X3, εkt
γ
) 
Organic⁡Competition = f(X4, εkt
α ) 
In this setup, Ad Position (AdPos) and Organic Competition (Organic_Comp) are endogenous, while 
the variables X1-X4 are exogenous. Identification arises from the fact that position is determined by the 
exogenous variables: bid and LQScore. As noted above, the bid for each keyword is randomized 
(exogenous) in our setup, and LQScore is a value internally calculated by the search engine for each 
keyword, and remains stable for the short period of our experiment, unless the advertisers change their 
ads or landing pages to influence the quality score. Similarly, Organic Competition is completely 
determined by the instrumental variable, which is not correlated with the error term. Position and Organic 
Competition in turn influence click and conversion performance. 
Thus the rank and order conditions are satisfied for identification purposes (Greene, 1999). Lahiri and 
Schmidt (1978) have shown that the parameter estimates for a triangular system can be fully identified 
using Generalized Least Squares. Hausman (1975) shows that the likelihood function for a triangular 
system is the same as for Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. Zellner (1962) has addressed triangular 
systems from a Bayesian point of view, and shows that the posterior probability distribution function is 
the same as in a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions setting. Triangular systems have been estimated using 
the classical approach (Elberse and Eliashberg 2003; Godes and Mayzlin 2004) and more recently in 
sponsored search using the Bayesian approach (Ghose and Yang 2009; Yang and Ghose 2010; Agarwal, 
Hosanagar and Smith 2011).  
We estimate the model using a Bayesian approach, applying Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling 
due to the non-linear characteristics of our model (Rossi and Allenby, 2005). A more detailed discussion 
of the priors and conditional posteriors of this model is given in the Online Appendix A. For the HB 
Models, we run the MCMC simulation for 80,000 draws and discard the first 40,000 as burn-in. In order 
to ensure that our parameter estimates are accurate we simulated the clicks, orders, Ad position and 
Organic Competition using our estimates. By repeating the estimation with this simulated dataset we were 
able to recover our parameter estimates, indicating that our parameters are fully identified. 
We performed an F-test in the first stage for our instruments. In each case, the F-test value was well 
over 10, suggesting our instruments are not weak. To explore the quality of our instruments further, we 
explored the orthogonality of the instruments by inspecting the plots of the marginal posterior 
distributions for Zktεkat
θ  and Zktεkat
β
⁡as suggested by Duan and Mela (2009) and Musalem et al. (2008). 
We compute the 95% posterior predictive interval to assess whether it excludes zero as a test for rejecting 
orthogonality. We find that all the intervals contain zero which suggests that error term is not correlated 
with the instrument.  
Models with Alternative Measures of Competition 
We also consider two other measures of organic and sponsored competition. For a keyword at time t, we 
consider the total number of competitors’ listings appearing at the same level or above the focal advertiser 
normalized by their position as shown below: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘𝑡 = ∑
1
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐶𝑘𝑡
𝐶𝑘𝑡   where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐶𝑘𝑡 is the position of the listing of competitor C for keyword k 
at time t. This is a simpler measure of competition to ensure that our use of AlexaRank is not affecting our 
results.  
 We also use another measure of competition where we consider the sum of listings of each type 
appearing at the same level or above the focal advertiser normalized by their Alexa Rank as shown 
below: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘𝑡 = ∑
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘)
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡)
𝐶𝑘𝑡
 where 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑘𝑡  is the Alexa rank of the listing of competitor 
C for keyword k at time t. 
5. Results 
Click through rate (CTR) 
Table 4 provides the mean values for the posterior distribution of the ∆θ matrix and the covariance matrix 
V
θ
 from equation 2. The coefficient for organic competition (organic_comp) is significant and negative 
for all models. This suggests that consumers clicking on our advertiser’s ads are negatively influenced by 
the organic results and are less likely to click in the presence of higher organic competition. This 
empirically validates the assumption made in the literature about the negative impact of organic results on 
sponsored search performance (Katona and Sarvary 2010). Our results show that competitors’ organic 
listings may act as substitutes not complements, as suggested by Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. (2010). 
The presence of higher organic competition may lower attention to sponsored search and as a result, leads 
to a decrease in the click performance. This also suggests that even if consumers may learn about the 
quality of the ad based on the higher level of competition, it does not help the click performance of ads.  
The coefficient for ad position (AdPos) is negative and significant, indicating that click performance 
decays with position. This is similar to findings in the extant literature (Ghose and Yang, 2009; Yang and 
Ghose, 2010), and shows that click through rate decays with the position of the ad. 
The coefficient for sponsored competition (sponsored_comp) is not significant. This suggests that 
after controlling for position, sponsored competition does not impact the performance of ads. Some of the 
impact of sponsored competition is already captured in ad position. Any additional information that is 
conveyed by a variation in attributes such as the perceived quality of the sponsored competition (or their 
relative position) does not impose any externality on the click performance. Note that we use the same 
parameters to define both organic and sponsored competition. This suggests that organic competition has 
a higher impact on click performance than does sponsored competition. It is possible that position 
captures some effect of the number of sponsored competitors, and that is why we do not see an effect. We 
separately verify the relative impact of organic and sponsored competition in the robustness analysis 
without controlling for the effect of ad position. Our result also appears to contradict the observation 
made by Jeziorski and Segal (2012) where they show that higher sponsored competition decreases the 
click performance even after controlling for the effect of position. A key difference is that they use the 
expected click performance of competing ads for the keyword to measure the strength of competition 
whereas we rely on relative position and the overall perceived quality of the competitors’ sponsored 
listings to determine this value. Thus, our results suggest that consumers place more attention on these 
attributes of relative position and perceived quality for organic results than they do on sponsored results. 
The coefficient for Organic is insignificant. This is potentially due to the fact that very few keywords 
in our sample have the advertiser’s own listing in the organic search result. Additionally, the organic 
listing of the advertiser is always below the sponsored ad, and it is possible that consumers are not paying 
attention to the organic listing. The coefficient of LQScore is positive and significant, indicating that 
keywords with a higher LQScore have higher clickthrough rates than other keywords. This is consistent 
with expectations because LQScore accounts for factors such as ad quality.  
Finally, brand and keyword specificity have no significant impact on the click performance of 
keywords. The interaction of brand and specificity with organic competition or sponsored competition is 
also not significant. This suggests that the observed effects of organic and sponsored competition on CTR 
performance do not vary with keyword characteristics such as brand and specificity. 
Conversion rate (CONV) 
Table 5 provides the mean values for the posterior distribution of the ∆β matrix and the covariance matrix 
V
β
 in equation 4. The coefficient for Organic_Comp is significant and positive, implying that conversion 
rate improves with organic competition. Any variation in the brand and specificity of keywords does not 
change this outcome.
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It is interesting to note that even though clickthrough rate decreases with organic competition, 
consumers who make it to our advertiser’s website by clicking on the ad are more likely to buy in the 
presence of higher organic competition. In Table 1, we outlined two potential explanations for this 
observation. The first is awareness and learning effects. Consumers become aware of the relevance of the 
sponsored ads due to high organic competition. They can learn from the competition and update their 
quality perception of the advertiser (Athey and Ellison 2011). This may be particularly important in 
sponsored search because consumers are known to have a negative bias against sponsored search results 
(Jansen and Resnick 2006) and therefore the presence of high quality organic competition may lead the 
buyers to trust the sponsored ads more. 
Another potential explanation for the increase in conversion rate with organic competition is the 
recency effect. It is well known that the sequence of evaluation impacts a consumer’s purchase decision 
through primacy (Pieters and Bijmolt 1997) and recency effects (Wedel and Pieters 2000). An increase in 
organic competition may imply that consumers who do visit our advertiser’s website tend to do so 
                                                     
12 While the coefficient of the interaction term organic_competition x brand is positive, it is not significant in all our models. 
towards the end of their search. Having evaluated several promising alternatives, they may be buying 
from the most recently evaluated option. In order to determine if recency bias also plays a role in 
conversion we estimate our model with an interaction term between organic competition and the ad 
position. A recency effect, if present, should lead to a higher effect of organic competition at lower ad 
positions as consumers are more likely to evaluate the focal advertiser toward the end when it appears in 
the lower position. However, our results show that the interaction term has no effect (Table 6). This 
suggests that the increase in conversion performance is unlikely to be driven by the recency effect, and 
thus, awareness and learning effects may be more relevant in our setting than recency effects are. 
Combined with the CTR results, we conclude that competing organic results lead to fewer consumers 
visiting the sponsored search advertiser’s website but that consumers who do visit the website are more 
likely to purchase the product because of their evaluation of competitors’ organic listings. Our results also 
show that learning effects are indeed higher for buying consumers as compared to the consumers seeking 
information and as a result lead to opposite effect of competition on the click and conversion 
performance. 
The coefficient for AdPos is positive and significant, indicating that, on average, conversion rate 
increases with position. This result is similar to the finding by Agarwal, Hosanagar, and Smith (2011) and 
suggests that users visiting lower positions are more likely to buy than users visiting the top position. 
Note that this holds for only the top few positions, which is the case for our dataset (which only contains 
the top 10 positions).  
The coefficient for sponsored competition is not significant. This suggests that after controlling for ad 
position, buyers may not be influenced by the presence of higher sponsored competition. This is similar to 
the finding for click through rate. 
Ad Position & Organic Competition 
Table 7 provides the mean values for the posterior distribution of the ∆γ matrix and Vγ from equation 5. In 
these results, higher bids lead to higher current position (lower value of position). This is reasonable as 
bid is one of the primary inputs used to compute ad position, and higher values of bids should move the 
ad higher in the list of returned results. The coefficient for LQscore is negative and significant. Thus, a 
higher LQScore also leads to higher current position. This is expected as a higher LQScore for a keyword 
should help the ad be placed higher in the sponsored results. Table 8 provides the mean values for the 
posterior distribution of the ∆α matrix and Vα from equation 6. As expected, the coefficient for the 
instrument for Organic Competition is positive and significant.  
Finally, Table 9 shows the covariance between unobservables for CTR, CONV, ad position, and 
Organic Competition from equation 7. Covariance between the unobservables for CONV and CTR is 
statistically significant. This indicates that the unknown factors influencing consumer clicks also 
influence subsequent conversion behavior. The covariance between the unobservables for CTR or CONV 
and Organic Competition is also statistically significant. As error terms for CTR and CONV are also 
correlated, this suggests that the unobservables influencing Organic_Comp are influencing both CTR and 
CONV. Similarly, the covariance between the unobservables for Organic_Comp, and Ad position are 
statistically significant. This suggests that the unobservables influencing position are also influencing 
CTR and CONV, meaning that position and Organic_Comp are endogenous and the proposed 
simultaneous equation model helps to capture the effect of this endogeneity. 
We have taken several steps to evaluate the robustness of these results. Due to space constraints, 
detailed descriptions for the related models along with the estimates are given in the Online Appendix B. 
 
Revenue as a function of Organic Competition 
To determine the overall effect of organic competition on revenue, we calculate revenue using the 
posterior distribution of the CTR and CONV coefficients for each keyword (assuming a $10 average 
value of the associated products). We find that revenue increases with organic competition. Figure 3 
shows clicks and orders as a function of organic competition for the average ad position for a keyword in 
our sample. A potential explanation for increases in revenue with increased competition is that buyers 
clicking the advertiser listing end up buying from the advertiser much more in the presence of higher 
organic competition. This can counter the negative effect of fewer consumers visiting the ad in presence 
of higher organic competition.  
Impact of Organic Competition on Keyword Performance Prediction and Keyword Selection 
Our results suggest that click performance and revenue associated with keywords is influenced by organic 
competition. Using the additional organic competition information, advertisers can more accurately 
predict the performance of keywords. For illustration, we estimate the parameters of our main model both 
with and without organic competition using the first 4 weeks of our panel data as the estimation sample. 
We use the remaining two weeks as the holdout period and use these parameter estimates to predict the 
click and orders for the holdout period. We compared these predicted values with the actual values in the 
holdout sample. We find that the use of organic competition reduces the prediction error by 9% for clicks 
and 5% for orders. 
Additionally, advertisers can prioritize the most suitable keywords by allocating appropriate 
budgets and thereby improve their profitability using the organic competition information. For 
illustration, we estimate the profitability of the portfolio of our sample keywords with and without the use 
of organic competition information. The estimated profit for a keyword can be expressed as  
               π = I × (CTR⁡ × CONV × RPO − CTR × CPC) 
where I is the expected number of ad impressions; CTR is the click through rate, or the fraction of ad 
impressions that generate clicks; CONV is the conversion rate per click, or the fraction of clicks that 
generate orders; RPO is the revenue per order; and CPC is the average cost per click charged to an 
advertiser.  
We use the relationship between the search engine position and the advertiser’s bid (equation 5) to 
determine the cost. For a given bid and position j, we assume that the actual cost per click (CPC) is the 
bid for position j+1. We use the posterior distribution of the parameter estimates for CONV, CTR and the 
position equations to compute profits for each keyword with and without the organic competition 
information. As the position of the advertisement as well as the competition for each keyword keeps 
changing, we use the average position as well as the average competition for each keyword to predict the 
expected profit for that keyword. Figure C1 in online appendix C shows the change in CTR, CONV and 
profitability of our sample keywords with and without incorporating organic competition information. 
Then we allocate the budget across these keywords by weighing each keyword by its relative profitability 
under the two scenarios of estimating profitability with and without organic competition information.
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We compare the performance of the advertiser portfolio based on the budget allocation decision with and 
without organic competition.
14
 We find that for all of our sample keywords, the advertiser can improve 
the performance by 6% by making budget choices using organic competition information. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In our research we analyze how competing organic results affect the performance of sponsored search 
advertisements. While we know that consumers pay a lot of attention to organic results, very little has 
been formally established on the impact of organic competition on sponsored search performance. Ours is 
the first research we are aware of to systematically investigate the impact of competition in organic results 
on sponsored search performance. 
To do this, we use a unique dataset derived from a field experiment with an online retailer’s 
advertising campaign on Google. In this experiment we systematically (and exogenously) varied the 
advertiser’s bid to drive variation in the organic results of direct competitors likely to compete  with 
advertiser’s sponsored ad for consumers’ attention. We also use a web-crawler to capture the search 
results from competitors’ returned by these keywords. We analyze our data using a hierarchical Bayesian 
model, and accounting for the endogeneity of ad position and organic competition. We also control for the 
effect of sponsored competition.  
                                                     
13 For example, say the advertiser portfolio consists of keywords with predicted average profits Pk,o and Pk,wo with and without 
organic competition information for each keyword k. Then the fraction of budget allocated to a keyword k can be share of the profit 
𝑃𝑘,𝑎
∑ 𝑃𝑘,𝑎𝑘
 where 𝑎 = {𝑜, 𝑤𝑜}. This simple heuristic, while not necessarily the optimal budget allocation strategy, implements a common 
rule-of-thumb which is to allocate ad budgets in proportion of keyword profitability 
14Actual performance is always influenced by the organic competition. However, the advertiser may or may not incorporate the 
information to determine the profitability of a keyword.  
Our results show that increased organic competition leads to a decrease in the click-through rate of 
our retailer’s ads appearing on the right hand side. However, these changes may help the conversion rate 
of the retailer’s ads. Further, we find that sponsored competition has no impact on conversion 
performance, and has a less negative impact on click through performance as compared to the organic 
competition.  
Our study provides key managerial insights for advertisers. Many websites do not appear in organic 
results, or appear only for a few keywords, and rely heavily on sponsored search to advertise their 
products. Competitors can improve their organic ranking by investing in search engine optimization to 
make their pages more relevant for search results. Given that branding is driven primarily by clicks (Rutz 
and Bucklin, 2012) whereas transactional revenues are driven by conversions, advertisers interested only 
in branding may want to focus on keywords with lower organic competition. Conversion performance, 
however, can be helped by higher organic competition for the top page results. Thus, advertisers should 
consider different responses to competition, depending on the objective of their advertising campaign. 
Advertisers focus a lot on sponsored search competition and our results show that they can improve 
sponsored search performance by also analyzing organic competition. For example, we find that our focal 
advertiser can improve the profitability of the sample keywords by 6% by considering the impact of 
organic competition in estimating the performance of keywords and allocating the budgets accordingly.  
Our findings also have implication for search engines. Our results suggest that advertisers will get 
fewer clicks for their ads if the ads are shown in the presence of strong organic competition. However, 
advertisers are also likely to get higher revenue in the presence of strong organic competition. Thus, 
advertisers with a branding objective may have lower valuation for keywords with high organic 
competition whereas those with a conversion objective might value such keywords. In that case, search 
engines should suggest appropriate keywords to the advertisers based on the advertiser objectives. This 
would ensure lower mismatch between advertisers and keywords and would increase advertiser 
participation and in turn, increase the search engine revenue. Further, search engines should recognize 
that conversion performance may not mirror click performance, and thus click through rates alone may 
not be sufficient as performance measures for ads. 
Finally, our results inform the academic literature regarding the effect of competition in sponsored 
search environments in several ways. First, we show that organic competition has a greater impact on ad 
performance than sponsored competition. Further, click-through rate is negatively influenced by increase 
in organic competition, whereas conversion rate is positively influenced by this increase. Thus, prior 
findings that show a complementary effect of an advertiser’s own organic listing apply to the competing 
organic listings as well for conversions but not for clicks. Second, our results suggest that existing bid 
optimization approaches should also consider the role of organic competition in evaluating advertiser 
performance. Much of the prior literature on bid optimization has ignored the impact of organic listings.   
As with any empirical analysis there are several limitations of our study. While, our results explain 
some information search behavior of consumers at an aggregate level, the aggregate nature of our data 
limits our ability to account for the actions of individual consumers. This calls for future research using 
click stream data to empirically evaluate the behavior of different types of consumers in sponsored search 
environments. Additionally, our analysis of orders is based on measurements conducted by the SEM firm 
employed by the advertiser, wherein consumer action is tracked during the entire search session. This 
potentially underreports sales resulting from an advertisement, because consumers may click on an 
advertisement, visit the advertiser’s landing page without converting, but return later (even using a 
different search engine query) to then buy the product. In these instances, the future purchases are not 
properly attributed to the original keyword. Further, we restrict our analysis to keywords where advertiser 
chose to display ads with an ‘exact’ match. Future studies should validate these results for ads with a 
‘broad’ and ‘phrase’ match. We also note that our results are based on the analysis of field experiment 
data from a single retailer. Future studies should validate the results for other type of products and 
retailers.  
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Table 1:  Impact of Organic Competition on Propensity to Click and Convert  
 Click Through Rate  Conversion Rate 
Negative 
Effect 
Message Ordering  
Consumers  more likely to visit the 
advertiser towards the end due to 
increase in organic competition and 
less likely to click due to satiation  
(Jeziorski & Segal 2012) 
Message Ordering  
Consumers  more likely to visit the advertiser towards the end 
due to increase in organic competition and less likely to 
convert due to primacy effects (Pieters and Bijmolt 1997) 
Positive 
Effect 
Awareness & Learning 
High competition makes consumer 
aware of the relevance of sponsored 
ads ( Sahni 2013, Liu et al. 2015)  
and  update their belief  about the 
quality of focal advertiser (Athey 
and Ellison 2011) 
Message Ordering  
Consumers more likely to visit the advertiser towards the end 
due to increase in organic competition and more likely to 
convert due to recency  effects (Wedel and Pieters 2000) 
Awareness & Learning 
 High competition makes consumer aware of the relevance 
of sponsored ads ( Sahni 2013, Liu et al. 2015)  and  
update their belief about the quality of focal advertiser 
(Athey and Ellison 2011) 
 Buying consumers more likely to learn and update their 
belief about the quality of focal ad due to higher 
involvement (Moe 2003) and  subsequent learning (Park 
and Hastak, 1994; Wood and Lynch 2002).  
 Buying consumers more likely to recall competition while 
visiting focal ad site (Kent and Allen 1994) and more 
likely to learn in the presence of higher competition 
No Impact  Consumers do not rely on pre-screening information and buy 
from the best listing (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ulkumen 
2006) 
 
 
Table 2:  Keyword Performance Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Impressions 72.8 159 1 1666 
Clicks 1.1 2.2 0 24 
Orders 0.03 0.2 0 3 
AdPos 3.47 1.7 1 9.78 
Organic 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Organic_Comp normalized by position and Alexa 
Rank  
0.78 0.54 0 3.08 
Organic_Comp normalized by position  0.82 0.53 0 2.69 
Organic_Comp normalized by Alexa Rank 1.7 1.52 0 10.1 
IVOrganic 0.42 0.23 0.1 2.34 
Sponsored_Comp normalized by position and Alexa 
Rank  
1.79 0.89 0 5.59 
Sponsored_Comp normalized by position  1.82 0.95 0 4.43 
Sponsored_Comp normalized by Alexa Rank  3.28 2.1 0 11.4 
IVSponsored  1.49 1 0.13 5.19 
LQScore 8 1.5 6 10 
Brand 0.6 0.5 0 1 
Specificity 0.4 0.7 0 1 
Bid 0.5 0.3 0.08 2 
 
Table 3:  Correlation Matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Impressions (1) 1.00
Clicks (2) 0.42 1.00
Orders (3) 0.10 0.22 1.00
AdPos (4) 0.16 -0.08 -0.02 1.00
Organic (5) 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.15 1.00
Organic_Comp 
normalized by position 
and Alexa Rank (6)
-0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.16 0.00 1.00
Organic_Comp 
normalized by position 
(7)
-0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.05 0.87 1.00
Organic_Comp 
normalized by Alexa 
Rank (8)
-0.03 -0.11 0.01 0.54 0.07 0.72 0.54 1.00
IVOrganic (9) -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.38 -0.09 0.57 0.62 0.63 1.00
Sponsored_Comp 
normalized by position 
and Alexa Rank (10)
0.11 -0.10 0.00 0.49 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.35 0.19 1.00
Sponsored_Comp 
normalized by position 
(11)
0.16 -0.02 0.03 0.51 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.31 0.28 0.85 1.00
Sponsored_Comp 
normalized by Alexa 
Rank (12)
0.11 -0.11 -0.02 0.71 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.51 0.31 0.84 0.72 1.00
IVSponsored (13) 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.52 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.24 0.65 0.77 0.67 1.00
LQScore (14) -0.20 0.05 0.00 -0.14 -0.06 0.24 0.31 0.04 0.16 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 1.00
Bid (15) 0.21 0.25 0.16 0.17 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.32 -0.14 1.00
 Table 4:  Estimates for the CTR 
  
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by 
position and 
Alexa rank    
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by  
position    
Cumulative 
Competition 
Normalized by  
Alexa Rank 
Const -4.22 (0.55)*** -4.35 (0.63)*** -4.84 (0.32)*** 
AdPos -1.42 (0.18)*** -1.67 (0.16)*** -1.06 (0.21)*** 
Organic_Comp -0.41 (0.15)*** -0.27 (0.14)** -0.23 (0.11)** 
Sponsored_Comp -0.17 (0.12) -0.01 (0.15) -0.08 (0.08) 
Organic -0.2 (0.2) -0.16 (0.1) -0.2 (0.17) 
LQScore 0.3 (0.06)*** 0.32 (0.05)*** 0.34 (0.03)*** 
Time -0.01 (0.0)*** -0.011 (0.002)*** -0.013 (0.002)*** 
Brand 0.25 (0.51) -0.17 (0.47) 0.24 (0.39) 
Specificity -0.51 (0.65) -0.45 (0.66) 0.35 (0.64) 
Organic_Comp x Brand -0.09 (0.36) 0.14 (0.31) 0.02 (0.23) 
Sponsored_Comp x Brand -0.01 (0.29) 0.12 (0.27) -0.05 (0.19) 
Organic_Comp x Specificity 0.64 (0.42) 0.69 (0.37)* 0.13 (0.28) 
Sponsored_Comp x Specificity 0.55 (0.37) 0.42 (0.36) 0.08 (0.24) 
*,**,*** Statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Table 5:  Estimates for the CONV 
  
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by 
position and 
Alexa rank    
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by  
position    
Cumulative 
Competition 
Normalized by  Alexa 
Rank 
Const -2.75 (0.68)*** -3.58 (0.53)*** -2.73 (0.44)*** 
AdPos 0.81 (0.28)*** 0.54 (0.21)*** 0.35 (0.26) 
Organic_Comp 0.7 (0.18)*** 0.62 (0.19)*** 0.29 (0.12)** 
Sponsored_Comp -0.27 (0.17) 0.23 (0.15) 0.08 (0.09) 
Organic 0.17 (0.25) 0.3 (0.2) 0.11 (0.2) 
LQScore -0.01 (0.06) -0.12 (0.05)** -0.02 (0.04) 
Time -0.01 (0.0)** -0.001 (0.004) -0.008 (0.002)*** 
Brand -0.77 (0.58) 1.41 (0.52)*** 0.95 (0.48)** 
Specificity -0.25 (1.01) 3.62 (0.82)*** 2.09 (0.64)*** 
Organic_Comp x Brand 1.27 (0.42)*** 0.43 (0.41) 0.3 (0.27) 
Sponsored_Comp x Brand -0.31 (0.39) -0.32 (0.44) -0.11 (0.23) 
Organic_Comp x Specificity 0.52 (0.49) 0.04 (0.47) -0.12 (0.35) 
Sponsored_Comp x Specificity 0.58 (0.45) -0.48 (0.38) -0.18 (0.26) 
*,**,*** Statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 Table 6:  Effect of Organic Competition at Different Ad Positions 
  CTR CONV 
Const -3.62 (0.57)*** -1.84 (0.88)** 
AdPos -1.21 (0.2)*** 0.63 (0.22)*** 
Organic_Comp -0.29 (0.15)** 0.74 (0.2)*** 
Sponsored_Comp -0.11 (0.13) -0.01 (0.26) 
OrganicPos -0.04 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)* 
Quality Score 0.239 (0.044)*** -0.374 (0.079)*** 
Time -0.012 (0.004)*** -0.031 (0.003)*** 
Brand -0.52 (0.56) 0.29 (0.64) 
Specificity -0.13 (0.72) 3.56 (0.81)*** 
Organic_Comp x Brand -0.02(0.35) 0.77(0.49) 
Sponsored_Comp x Brand -0.07(0.31) 0.03(0.41) 
Organic_Comp x Specficity 0.35(0.44) -0.19(0.54) 
Sponsored_Comp x Specificity -0.02(0.36) 0.16(0.46) 
AdPos x Organic Comp -0.05 (0.32) -0.42 (0.32) 
*,**,*** Statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 
Table 7:  Estimates for the Ad Position 
  
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by position 
and Alexa rank    
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by  
position    
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by  Alexa 
Rank 
Const 1.03 (0.16)*** 1.01 (0.17)*** 0.99 (0.16)*** 
Log(Bid) -0.45 (0.08)*** -0.45 (0.08)*** -0.45 (0.08)*** 
LQScore -0.049 (0.01)*** -0.048 (0.02)*** -0.045 (0.01)*** 
Time -0.002 (0.0)*** -0.12 (0.05)** -0.002 (0.0)*** 
    
*,**,*** Statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 
Table 8:  Estimates for the Organic Competition 
  
Cumulative Competition 
normalized by position 
and Alexa rank    
Cumulative 
Competition 
normalized by  position    
Cumulative Competition 
normalized by  Alexa 
Rank 
Const 0.07 (0.17) 0.17 (0.16) 0.49 (0.38) 
Organic_Comp IV 1.86 (0.21)*** 1.63 (0.17)*** 4.36 (0.49)*** 
Time -0.004 (0.0)*** -0.005 (0.0)*** -0.006 (0.0)*** 
*,**,*** Statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 
Table 9:  Estimates for the Covariance Matrix Ω 
Cumulative Competition normalized by position and Alexa rank 
  CONV CTR Pos Organic_Comp 
CONV 0.37 (0.06)*** -0.036 (0.015)** 0.00 (0.009) -0.005 (0.014) 
CTR   0.232 (0.02)*** 0.007 (0.008) 0.02 (0.008)** 
Pos     0.064 (0.003)*** -0.005 (0.002)** 
Organic_Comp       0.087 (0.004)*** 
Cumulative Competition normalized by position  
 
  CONV CTR Pos Organic_Comp 
CONV 0.477 (0.036)*** -0.035 (0.017)** -0.007 (0.012) 0.004 (0.02) 
CTR   0.259 (0.018)*** 0.009 (0.007) 0.023 (0.01)** 
Pos     0.064 (0.003)*** -0.007 (0.002)*** 
Organic_Comp       0.087 (0.004)*** 
     
Cumulative Competition normalized by Alexa Rank 
     
  CONV CTR Pos Organic_Comp 
CONV 0.403 (0.031)*** -0.092 (0.016)*** -0.009 (0.008) -0.071 (0.027)*** 
CTR   0.224 (0.019)*** 0.004 (0.006) 0.06 (0.035)* 
Pos     0.064 (0.003)*** 0.056 (0.006)*** 
Organic_Comp       0.588 (0.024)*** 
 
 
Figure 1:  Competing Organic and Sponsored Listings for Different Positions of the Focal 
Advertiser 
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Figure 2:  Website Hierarchy for Pet Food Website 
 
Figure 3:  Impact of Organic Competition on Ad Performance 
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